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Response to Prof. Ernest B. Hook’s
Comments On “So-Called Euroasianism”
Dimitry Shlapentokh
dshlapen@iusb.edu
I was quite pleased by the fact that a professor, a full professor from the prestigious
University of California Berkeley, not only read my article, but commented on it.
(Comparative Civilizations Review: No. 82. 129, 2020) Indeed, millions of articles are
published every year, and the vast majority are absolutely ignored.
In order to respond to Professor Hook’s criticisms, I believe I need to do the following:
1) To provide a short synopsis of my article, “The Twisted Mirror of Perception:
Social Science in Service of Political/Ideological Expediency – The Case of
Russian Eurasianism.” (Comparative Civilizations Review: No. 81. 9-29, 2019)
It will help those potential readers who did not read my original article.
2) I would not elaborate on Prof. Hook’s assertion that I am a “Putinist” and do
not see the evil of Putin’s dictatorship. The reason for this is simple: the
response requires another long, separate letter. And my present response is long
enough. At the same time, I would be happy to respond to Professor Hook’s
statement in a separate letter, of course upon request. Also, Professor Hook as
well as others, of course, could find useful information about my views about
Putin’s regime in my forthcoming book, to be released by Palgrave.
3) I will focus on two of Professor Hook’s objections:
a) I claim that Francis Fukuyama was almost universally accepted in the
beginning of the post-Cold War era, and
b) I claim that both Gorbachev by the end of his tenure and Yeltsin were
viewed quite negatively by the majority of Russians.
Prof. Hook published a critical response to my article on the fate of Eurasianism, the
idiosyncratic political/philosophical doctrine which emerged among Russian émigrés
in the 1920s. I hold that interest in the creed in the United States and assessment of its
influence in Russia has been related not so much to the influence of the teaching in
Russia, but to the need of the “market,” the general public, political and economic elite,
and academia. And this implicitly shows how intellectual output is produced in the
West, especially the USA.
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Consequently, Western scholars ignored or marginalized Eurasianism when it was
quite popular in Russia, plainly because Eurasianism, with its stress on Russian cultural
uniqueness and penchant for authoritarian/totalitarian rule, did not fit the prevailing
Fukuyamian “end of history.” At the same time, interest in the creed re-emerged in the
2000s and especially after 2014, when American observers started to assert that
Eurasianism, or at least such people as Alexander Dugin, became quite influential in
shaping Kremlin policy.
It was done at the time when interest in Eurasianism in Russia had declined sharply and
Dugin became a political non-entity for the Kremlin.
The reason for such changes in views was, once again, the need of the American public,
at least a good part of it – the socio-economic and related political elite. All of them
wanted to present Russia as an insane imperialist, pouncing on the peaceful West.
Thus, I conclude that many Western, especially American, scholars do not so much
study events “as they are,” to paraphrase Leopold von Ranke’s famous expression, but
as a “marketable” intellectual product, often decorated with a postmodernist “fig leaf.”
The assumption that American scholars do not engage in abstract detached research but
often instinctively look for “marketable” intellectual output, whereas the market could
be the public, academia, or government, apparently irritated Prof. Hook and led him to
respond to my article, raising several objections. I will limit my analysis to two of
them. First, he challenged my assumption that the premise of Fukuyamism was
universally accepted. Secondly, he challenged my statement that Gorbachev and
Yeltsin were hated by the majority.
Let me start with his first premise. I am a historian, and one of the principles of the
craft is to look at a phenomenon from a historical perspective. Timing is often, albeit
not always, essential. If I were to state that Fukuyamism is prevailing today, I would
definitely be wrong. After Trump’s victory, the rise of “populism” and the statement
of Fukuyama himself, who often started to sound quite un-Fukuyamian, one could
indeed state that the idea of total domination of the “end of history” is far-fetched.
Moreover, there is one publication in a most prestigious press which elaborates on some
ideas that were unthinkable, almost obscene, a generation ago. Jason Brennan
published a book entitled Against Democracy. The major notion of the book is
surprisingly simple: the idea of one-man-one-vote is dangerous. The point here is that
the average American is just a primitive, illogical “basket of deplorables,” if one would
remember Hillary Clinton’s expression, and their collective decisions could be
disastrous. Thus, only a few educated persons should make decisions.
There was hardly novelty in this idea.
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Even those who had the most perfunctory knowledge of history or political thought
would state that such an idea has been in circulation for more than 2,000 years, at least
from the time of Plato and Confucius. It looks as if it was widely circulated in presentday China. At least this idea was elaborated to me in impeccable English by a young
Chinese woman with whom I strolled along by a lake in the summer residence of the
Chinese emperors.
The extraordinary nature of the book is the fact that it was published by a leading
academic publishing house (Princeton University Press). There is no doubt that at the
time when Fukuyama penned his famous essay, the proposal for such a book would be
immediately rejected by any Western publisher, more so by such a prestigious one as
Princeton University Press.
Jason Brennan is hardly alone in his views on democracy and implicitly on average
Westerners, especially Americans. Tom Nichols, a contributor to the prestigious
Foreign Affairs, lamented that present-day average Americans ignore the views of
experts and have become stupid, arrogant zombies. The present-day intellectual and,
implicitly, political arrangements are nothing but the road to “idiocracy” and “in such
an environment, anything and everything becomes possible, including the end of
democracy and republican government itself.” (Tom Nichols, “How America lost faith
in expertise. And why that’s a giant problem,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2017,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-02-13/how-america-lostfaith-e...)
Tom Nichols’s view on democracy and implicitly the hoi polloi is structurally similar
to Brennan’s, albeit not without a difference: For Brennan, the “deplorable” is still in
power and should be replaced by the rule of the enlightened authoritarian elite, for
Nichols the elite is still in power. Still, its enlightened rule could be challenged by
rising “deplorables.”
Yet, with all their differences, both authors implicitly conclude that democracy as it is
usually understood is not a workable institution. So, when I state that Fukuyamism
was almost totally embraced in the West, especially in the USA, I mean not today or
even more so tomorrow, when authoritarianism and, possibly even totalitarianism,
could be increasingly in vogue, especially if the economy tanks. However, I am
speaking of what was true more than 30 years ago, in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
If Fukuyamism were not the dominant trend, anti-Fukuyamian ideas would be visible
and manifest themselves either in publications in leading mass media, books and, last
but not least, employment of those who opposed the creed in leading universities, think
tanks, etc. And here, the authors of those articles and books, well placed in prestigious
positions, could well challenge Fukuyama’s statement about American capitalism as
the best among all possible arrangements.
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They could note that the United States is hardly the promised land from all perspectives.
Already by the late 1980s the process of the country’s deindustrialization was in full
swing and while factories were closing, the statistics faithfully recorded an economic
rise. High inflation, often marginalized by statistics, was also underway, making higher
education and medical services increasingly out of reach for the majority. And of
course in the future, it would affect housing and even food. As a matter of fact the
present-day economic troubles could be traced to this time.
Indeed, the current pandemic is a case of just an acceleration of the economic decline,
with generations-long roots. One might remember here that the Black Death did not
prevent the flourishing of the Renaissance, and the Spanish Flu did not stop the advent
of the “Roaring Twenties,” despite the fact that both these pandemics led to a
catastrophic loss of life. Finally, these observers could well pay much more attention
than Fukuyama did to urban ghettos, populated by minorities. Their residents were
poor, desperate, criminalized and ready for violence.
The critics of Fukuyama’s ideas shall be connected with the view of China. As a matter
of fact, the publication of Fukuyama’s essay coincided with the brutal suppression of
protests in the center of Beijing. The observers could have noted that while these
actions were brutal – thousands were killed – it was the only way to save the country
from chaos and disintegration, and preservation of its totalitarian skeleton, essential for
China’s spectacular rise.
There is no doubt that these views circulated, at least in foreign countries. They could
well exist in the USA, and if they were indeed spread, those who embrace them could
well elaborate on their views on the pages of leading mass media, publishing their
monographs with prestigious presses, such as Princeton University, where a similar
treatise would be published thirty years later. And, of course, they could have been
employed by major universities, think tanks, and government offices. From their
position they could argue with supporters of Fukuyama’s creed.
The conflict between opposite views propagated by people with the same social status
would help to develop social thought in a truly unfettered manner. Is not the USA
supposedly a place of the “free market of ideas”? Still, those people who would preach
these ideas not only would not be published in leading publishing houses and teach in
top universities, but they, most likely, would not have any academic employment at all
even if openings were in abundance. They would most likely drive cabs or flip burgers.
The second question in the letter was related to my views that most Russians started to
hate Yeltsin and Gorbachev soon after their rise. Prof. Hook noted that my claims are
not substantiated, for no public opinion polls indicate the feelings of the majority.
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Moreover, he could well note that all Western monographs and countless articles
present both of them as heroic individuals and it was suggested that the majority of
Russians were quite pleased with them, the liberators from the totalitarian grip.
These, like many other political and historical images, are axiomatic in American
political science and public opinion in general. I remember that when Yeltsin died, I
was interviewed by local radio about him. Still, when I stated that many Russians had
no good feelings about Yeltsin, the interview was abruptly ended. So much for the
“free market of ideas.”
The subject of the study of public opinion has some personal importance to me. I am
a historian by training and interests, albeit I became more interested in more recent
events by the end of my academic career – I am 69 now. Still, my late father, Vladimir
Shlapentokh, a professor at Michigan State University for almost 40 years, pioneered
in the study of public opinion in the USSR. (He also published a dozen books and
countless articles in the USA.)
As in the beginning of my letter, I noted that time is quite important to the study of a
phenomenon. For present-day Russians in their 20s and 30s, not only Gorbachev but
Yeltsin also are the stuff of their parents and grandparents. They could not compare
Yeltsin’s Russia and even more so Gorbachev’s USSR with the pre-perestroika Soviet
regime.
When I noted that most people hated Gorbachev and Yeltsin I meant people of my age
range, 50s through 70s and above, those who could compare Gorbachev’s and Yeltsin’s
era with the late/pre-Gorbachev Soviet periods.
Life in the late Soviet Union was hardly pleasant for the majority of Soviets. The
problem was not the absence of “liberties” and “democracy” (of course free from the
“perversion” of “populism”) but for another, more mundane reason. The food supply
was not adequate – meat was in great shortage in most provincial cities – living quarters
were crowded and consumer goods, such as clothing, were often of low quality; at least
these clothes were often made without any concern for fashion.
It was these problems which concerned the vast majority of Russians, especially those
who lived in the provinces, where the supply – of course centralized by the state – was
much scantier than in the capital and, possibly, a few other big cities. While the lives
of most ordinary Russians were hardly glamorous, the West, especially the USA, was
perceived as a place of riches, glamor, and all conceivable pleasures, mostly, of course,
sensual ones. A few Soviets, mostly highly-positioned figures, who visited the West
in official positions and were treated accordingly by their also well-placed hosts, also
brought this glamorous vision of the West.
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They also might have informed their interlocutors back in the USSR that the average
Westerner, especially the average American, is quite friendly to strangers and always
smiles, quite different from the grim-looking Soviet bureaucrats and average Soviets
in the crowd.
Thus, the West and related capitalist democracies were indeed viewed by many average
Russians in the context of Fukuyamism, long before the publication of his essay.
It was not surprising that quite a few cheered at the emergence of Gorbachev, the
smiling, affable leader who promised to lead Soviets, if not to full-fledged American
capitalism to at least “socialism” in a Bernie Sanders fashion. They were as excited as
most émigrés who first saw the contours of skyscrapers in Manhattan.
Still, soon enough, the excitement was short-lived. It was not because Gorbachev’s
reforms and “openness” and “perestroika” (restructuring) slowed its course. Actually,
with each year, there was more and more “openness.” The results on the ground were,
however, hardly pleasing. Soviet food supermarkets were hardly well-stocked,
especially in the provinces. Still, they became almost empty as “openness” progressed.
Finally, they would be stocked again. Still, the prices, including for staples, rose to
unbelievably high levels, at least in relation to the average Russian salary.
Moreover, increasingly, even formally working people did not receive their salaries
and had no place to go besides being criminals. Indeed, crime, including violent crime,
became increasingly a part of daily life. Prostitution also became pandemic. All of
these processes intensified considerably when Yeltsin came to power. In addition, not
only did the USSR fall apart, but millions of ethnic Russians, actually any Russianspeaking folk, became a peculiar new edition of Sudetendeutsch, and discriminated
against in many post-Soviet republics. In addition, NATO forces moved closer to
Russia’s borders. What should have been the feeling of the majority, those whose
views were often ignored by Western media?
Of course, these people have nothing but revulsion toward both Gorbachev and Yeltsin.
And many of them, those who are in their 70s and who remember well the late
Brezhnev’s Russia and the USSR, transformed the past into an almost ideal society.
They have rediscovered, retrospectively, the goodness of late Soviet rule: absolute job
security, the stability of prices for staples, miniscule payments for rent and utilities,
free higher education and medical services, etc. All problems were forgotten.
To understand the feelings of these people one needs to be engaged in Gallup polls.
One might add here that polls, even in the United States, are not always reliable when
the pollsters, like many intellectuals, are more concerned with production of
“politically correct” results rather than studying reality, as I noted in my article. One
could remember the recent presidential campaign.
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Donald Trump, the Republican contender, was clearly not just a misogynist but a rapist.
His obscenity violated all political taboos. All the pundits were sure that such a person
could not be elected as president. Thus, practically all polls predicted Trump’s defeat.
Still, he was elected.
I clearly do not agree with Prof. Hook’s statements. Still, I understand that the major
problem with my article was not so much my statements that a) Fukuyamism was the
dominant creed, at least in the USA in the late 1980s and early 1990s and seen as
universally applicable, and that b) hatred of Gorbachev (in the later years of his tenure)
and Yeltsin was widespread. Not even my alleged “Putinism” was the reason for this
rancor.
The reason, most likely, is different. I asserted that quite a few Western, especially
American, scholars, in a way American intellectuals in general, do not so much study
a phenomenon as it is but produce “marketable” products for “peer-reviewed” scholars
or the broader public at large. Prof. Hook clearly does not accept this notion. Still,
even critics are important, for they provide a framework for intellectual discourse and
development of social thought.
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